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AVOIDING PATTERNS AND MAKING THE BEST CHOICE
BRANT JONES
ABSTRACT. We study a variation of the game of best choice (also known as the secretary problem or
game of googol) under an additional assumption that the ranks of interview candidates are restricted us-
ing permutation pattern-avoidance. We develop some general machinery for investigating interview or-
derings with a non-uniform rank distribution, and give a complete description of the optimal strategies
for the pattern-avoiding games under each of the size three permutations. The optimal strategy for the
“disappointment-free” (i.e. 321-avoiding) interviews has a form that seems to be new, involving thresholds
based on value-saturated left-to-right maxima in the permutation.
1. INTRODUCTION
The game of best choice has been considered under many different names by researchers with a wide
variety of perspectives. In the classical story, a player conducts interviews with a fixed number N of
candidates. After each interview, the player ranks the current candidate against all of the candidates that
have previously been considered (without ties). The interviewer must then decide whether to accept the
current candidate and end the game or, alternatively, whether to reject the current candidate forever and
continue playing in the hope of obtaining a better candidate in the future. (These rules model a “tight”
market in which each candidate has many options for employment and will not be available to be recalled
for a second interview later in the game.)
Various facets and extensions of this model can be investigated but the most developed line of inquiry
is to describe a strategy that maximizes the player’s chance of hiring the candidate ranked best among
the N candidates. Notably, the classical analysis of this game assumes that all N ! orderings of rankings
into interviews are equally likely. It turns out that the form of the optimal strategy is to reject an initial
set of candidates and use them as a training set by hiring the next candidate who is better than all of them
(or the last candidate if no subsequent candidate is better). The question then becomes when to make the
transition from rejection to hiring: If the training set is small, it is likely that our standards will be set
too low to capture the best candidate; if it is large, it is likely that it already contains the best candidate
who will be interviewed and rejected. After some analysis, it turns out that the asymptotically optimal
transition point is after we have rejected the first 1/e ≈ 37% of candidates; the probability of success
with this strategy is also 1/e as N tends to infinity.
Although this analysis is mathematically pithy, involving the constant e in a surprising way, we believe
the assumption that allN ! interview orderings are equally likely is ultimately unrealistic. Over the period
that the player is conducting the N interviews, there can be both extrinsic trends in the candidate pool as
well as intrinsic learning on the part of the interviewer. As the interviewer ranks the current candidates at
each step, they aquire information about the domain that should allow them to hone the pool to include
more relevant candidates at future time steps. Overall, this results in candidate ranks that are improving
over time (rather than uniform). We establish in this paper two new models that produce interesting
behavior in this direction.
To describe them, we employ pattern-avoidance in order to restrict the interview orderings. This is
a natural technique from the viewpoint of algebraic combinatorics although its application for the best
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choice game seems to be new. Throughout this paper, we model interview orderings as permutations.
The permutation pi of N is expressed in one-line notation as [pi1pi2 · · · piN ] where the pii consist of the
elements 1, 2, . . . , N (so each element appears exactly once). In the best choice game, pii is the rank of
the ith candidate interviewed in reality, where rankN is best and 1 is worst. What the player sees at each
step, however, are relative rankings. For example, corresponding to the interview order pi = [2516374],
the player sees the sequence of permutations
1, 12, 231, 2314, 24153, 241536, 2516374
and must use only this information to determine at which step to transition. The left-to-right maxima of
pi consist of the elements pii that are larger in value than all elements pij lying to the left. For example, in
the interview order pi = [2516374] the best candidate occurs in the sixth position and it is not difficult to
see that we will successfully hire them if and only if we transition from rejection to hiring between the
last two left-to-right maxima (i.e. after the fourth or fifth interview).
FIGURE 1. pi = [574239618]
Given a permutation pi of N and a permutation ρ of M ≤ N , we say that pi contains ρ as a pattern
if there exists a subsequence pii1pii2 · · · piiM of entries from pi in the same relative order as the entries
ρ1ρ2 . . . ρM of ρ. Otherwise, we say pi avoids ρ. This has a simple geometric interpretation when we
plot our permutations graphically by placing a point (i, j) in the Cartesian plane to represent pii = j.
In Figure 1, we show the plot of [574239618] and have highlighted a 321-instance in positions 2, 3,
and 8. As the example illustrates, neither the positions nor the values in a pattern instance need to be
consecutive. This permutation avoids 54321.
We call the best choice game restricted if we play on some subset of the N ! interview orderings
to obtain a distribution with, for simplicity, probability zero on interview orderings that are not in the
subset and uniform probability on the orderings that are in the subset. The choice of restriction criteria
represents the modeler’s beliefs about the overall effect of the player learning process on the interview
orderings. However, the player does not directly impose these restrictions from within the game.
In our first model, we avoid the permutation 231 which requires a sequence of interviews to be status-
seeking in the sense that each time we have an interview that is an improvement over some previous
interview, a floor is set for all future candidate rankings. Less drastically, one could imagine avoiding
[23 · · · (k − 1)k1] for various values of k (tending towards the classical game as k → ∞), but the case
we consider is the strongest nontrivial model in this direction. In a variation, avoiding 321 requires
interviews to be disappointment-free in the sense that each time we have an interview that is worse
than some previous interview, the new interview becomes a floor for all future candidate rankings. These
are illustrated in Figure 2. As above, one could extend this to consider a family of patterns of the form
[k(k − 1) · · · 21] for various k.
It is a surprising consequence of our analysis that although these patterns have symmetric descriptions
in terms of floor setting, they turn out to have very different optimal strategies and asymptotic success
probabilities! Namely, the status-seeking interviews have simple and robust optimal strategies that es-
sentially allow the player to transition from rejection to hiring at any time. This results in a probability
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FIGURE 2. Defining patterns for status-seeking and disappointment-free interview orders
of success that is a ratio of consecutive Catalan numbers which approaches 25% as N → ∞ (see The-
orem 3.6). Observe that this model allows a version of the game in which no candidate prefers another
interview position to their own! (By contrast, it is a recent criticism of the classical model that no candi-
date would prefer to be among the first 1/e interview positions as they will be rejected automatically.)
The disappointment-free interviews have a more subtle set of optimal strategies involving thresholds
based on value-saturated left-to-right maxima (see Corollary 4.9) but the probability of success ap-
proaches a limit that is more than 50% (see Corollary 4.12). Note that the optimal strategies for these
models are not mutually exclusive so one may wager a` la Pascal and implement both at the same time;
the optimal disappointment-free strategy is also optimal for the status-seeking model.
In Robbins’ problem (see [Bru05]) and other variants of the game where the player seeks to maximize
expected value, researchers develop ad hoc strategies for analysis (because it is not clear what form an
optimal strategy should take). As far as we know, thresholds based on saturated left-to-right maxima
have not appeared previously in the literature, but perhaps bear further investigation in light of the fact
that they yield the optimal strategy for our disappointment-free interview orders.
We now mention some further ties to earlier work. Martin Gardner’s 1960 Scientific American column
popularized what he called “the game of googol,” although the problem has roots which predate this.
His article has been reprinted in [Gar95]. One of the first papers to systematically study the game of
best choice in detail is [GM66]. Many other variations and some history have been given in [Fer89] and
[Fre83]. Recently, researchers (e.g. [BIKR08]) have begun applying the best-choice framework to online
auctions where the “candidate rankings” are bids (that may arrive and expire at different times) and the
player must choose which bid to accept, ending the auction.
Although there is an established “Cayley” or “full-information” version of the game in which the
player observes values from a given distribution, it seems that only a few papers have considered al-
ternative rank distributions directly. The paper [RF88] considers an explicit continuous probability dis-
tribution that allows for dependencies between nearby arrival ranks via a single parameter. Inspired
by approximation theory, the paper [KKN15] also studies some general properties of non-uniform rank
distributions for the secretary problem.
Recent work of Buchbinder et al. [BJS14] uses linear programming to find algorithms for solving
best choice problems motivated by applications to online auctions. They give an “incentive-compatible”
mechanism for which the probability of selecting a candidate is independent of their position, a property
that is closely related to the main finding for our status-seeking game. Under the rule that candidates may
not be recalled once rejected, their strategy is shown to succeed with probability 1/4, exactly the same
as our asymptotic result for the status-seeking interviews! At the moment, this seems to be a curious
coincidence.
From the algebraic combinatorics perspective, Wilf has collected some results on distributions of left-
to-right maxima in [Wil95] and Prodinger [Pro02] has studied these under a geometric random model.
Although we phrase our results in terms of the game of best choice, they may also be viewed in some
cases as an extension of the literature on distributions of left-to-right maxima to subsets of pattern-
avoiding permutations. More recently, several authors have investigated the distribution of various per-
mutation statistics for a random model in which a pattern-avoiding permutation is chosen uniformly at
random. For example, [MP14] finds the positions of smallest and largest elements as well as the number
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of fixed points in a random permutation avoiding a single pattern of size 3; [MP16] finds the probability
that one or two specified points occur in a random permutation avoiding 312; and the work of several au-
thors [DHW03, FMW07] determines the lengths of the longest monotone and alternating subsequences
in a random permutation avoiding a single pattern of size 3. We also consider uniformly random 321-
avoiding and 231-avoiding permutations in our work, but the statistics we are concerned with arise from
the game of best choice. In some sense, our results refine the question of where a uniformly random
pattern-avoiding permutation achieves its maximum because in our problem we want to transition so as
to capture the maximum value.
We now outline the rest of this paper. In Section 2, we introduce the notion of strike sets that express
optimal strategies when we restrict our interview orderings to some subset of permutations, and recall
basic properties of the Catalan and ballot numbers that serve as denominators for our probabilities. The
rest of the paper characterizes the optimal strategies that arise when we avoid a single pattern of size
3. In Sections 3 and 4 we analyze the status-seeking and disappointment-free models, respectively. We
consider the remaining patterns of size 3 in Section 5.
2. STRIKES AND STRATEGIES
Fix a subset IN of permutations of size N . Such a subset defines a restricted game of best choice as
follows.
Definition 2.1. Given a sequence of i distinct integers, we define its flattening to be the unique permuta-
tion of {1, 2, . . . , i} having the same relative order as the elements of the sequence. Given a permutation
pi, define the ith prefix flattening, denoted pi|[i], to be the permutation obtained by flattening the se-
quence pi1, pi2, . . . , pii.
In the restricted game of best choice, some pi ∈ IN is chosen (uniformly randomly, with probability
1/|IN |) and each prefix flattening pi|[1], pi|[2], . . . is presented sequentially to the player. If the player
stops at value N , they win; otherwise, they lose.
To describe the form of an optimal strategy for such games, form the prefix tree consisting of all
possible prefixes partially ordered by the prefix flattenings they contain. For example, the complete tree
for N = 4 is shown in Figure 3. The N th level always includes all of the actual interview orders from
IN that may be encountered.
1 (6/24)
12 (6/12)
123 (3/4)
1234 1243 1342 2341
132 (0/4)
1324 1423 1432 2431
231 (0/4)
2314 2413 3412 3421
21 (0/12)
213 (3/4)
2134 2143 3142 3241
312 (0/4)
3124 4123 4132 4231
321 (0/4)
3214 4213 4312 4321
FIGURE 3. Unrestricted prefix tree for N = 4 with strike probabilities
A strike strategy for a restricted game of best choice is defined by a collection of prefixes we call
the strike set. To play the strategy on a particular interview ordering pi, compare prefix flattenings to the
strike set at each step. As soon as the ith prefix flattening occurs in the strike set, accept the candidate at
position i and end the game. Otherwise, the strike strategy rejects the candidate at position i to continue
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It follows directly from the definitions that any strategy (including the optimal strategy) for a game
of best choice can be represented as a strike strategy because the player has only the relative ranking
information captured in the prefix flattenings to guide them as they play. It suffices to restrict our attention
to strike sets that are antichains, meaning that no pair of elements are related in the prefix tree. If
the descendants of a strike set eventually include every permutation of size N , we say the strategy is
complete. Given a subset S of prefixes, the completion of S is the strike set consisting of the prefixes
from S together with all the permutations from IN that are not descendants of any prefix in S.
For each prefix p, let the strike probability SN (p) represent the probability of winning the game if p
is included in the strike set for the subset of interview orderings containing p as a prefix. Explicitly for
p = p1p2 · · · pk, say that pi is p-winnable if pi has p as a prefix flattening and value N in the kth position.
Then SN (p) is the number of p-winnable permutations divided by the total number of permutations from
IN having p as a prefix flattening. Note this implies that SN (p) is 0 unless p ends in a left-to-right
maximum. For this reason, we refer to a prefix as eligible if it ends in a left-to-right maximum. We have
indicated the SN (p) values for N = 4 in Figure 3 with ineligible prefixes shown in gray.
Given a complete strike set A, the probability of winning using the corresponding strike strategy is
then
P(A) =
⊕
p∈A
SN (p)
where
(a) We view the probabilities SN (p) as pairs of integers given by the numerator (number of p-
winnable permutations) and denominator (total number of permutations having p as a prefix
flattening), not as rational numbers.
(b) We sum a
b
and c
d
as the probability of the union of their underlying (independent) events, so
a
b
⊕ c
d
= a+c
b+d .
We say that a complete strike set A is optimal if P(A) is maximal among all complete strike sets A.
Observe that the following “backwards induction” algorithm will always find an optimal strike set A.
Algorithm 2.2. Begin with A equal to IN . Choose an eligible prefix p of maximal size that has not
yet been considered as part of this algorithm. If S(p) is larger than the probability of winning on the
interviews restricted to the subforest strictly below the p in the prefix tree, playing under the best strategy
that has been obtained so far, then replace the elements of A having p as a prefix with p. Otherwise,
continue on to the next unconsidered eligible prefix. Eventually, we will consider the prefix [1] at which
point A will be a globally optimal strike set.
Example 2.3. By inspection, the optimal strike set for the unrestricted set of interview orders in N = 4
is the completion of {12, 213, 3124, 3214}, contributing 11 winners. (This strategy coincides with the
strategy that rejects the first candidate and selects the next left-to-right maximum thereafter.)
In the unrestricted best choice game, the SN (p) probability for an eligible prefix p is equal to the
SN (p
′) probability for any other eligible prefix p′ of the same size. This follows because we can perform
an automorphism of the symmetric group that rearranges all of the permutations with prefix flattening
p to have prefix flattening p′. Using arguments from [Kad94], the classical results can then be stated
in terms of a positional strategy in which the player rejects the first k candidates and accepts the next
left-to-right maximum thereafter.
It is possible to generalize this to a trigger strategy by defining a set of prefixes to be triggers in
the sense that when a prefix flattening of pi matches an element of the trigger set, the player rejects the
current interview candidate but accepts the next left-to-right maximum thereafter. In the classical case,
optimal trigger sets consist of all prefixes having the critical 1/e size.
More generally still, we may consider some statistic from the set of prefixes to nonnegative integers
(say) together with a threshold function for that statistic that can be used to define a threshold trigger
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or threshold strike strategy. That is, once the statistic is larger than the threshold, accept the current
interview candidate (strike) or transition to accept the next left-to-right maximum (trigger). For example,
the size statistic together with the 1/e trigger threshold defines the optimal strategy in the classical case,
and we will see in Section 4 that the number of value-saturated left-to-right maxima together with a
quadratic strike threshold function defines the optimal strategy in the disappointment-free (i.e. 321-
avoiding) case. It is an interesting problem to characterize or determine properties of IN that restrict the
optimal strategy to one of these classes.
Given two restriction criteria, we say that the resulting prefix trees are isomorphic if there exists a
bijection from the nodes of one tree to the other that preserves the tree structure as well as the SN (p)
values. In this situation, we then obtain isomorphic strike sets to describe optimal strategies for the two
games and the probabilities of success under optimal play will be equal. In this work, our restriction
criteria come from permutation pattern avoidance and we call two patterns best-choice Wilf equivalent
if they induce the same optimal probability of success in each restricted game of best choice for all N .
Clearly, when two patterns induce isomorphic prefix trees they are best-choice Wilf equivalent (and we
know of no other examples). In the subsequent sections of this paper, we will find that there are four of
these generalized Wilf equivalence classes inS3:
231 ∼= 132, 321 ∼= 312, 123, 213.
Define the integer sequence of Catalan numbers CN by
CN =
∑
i+j=N−1
CiCj = C0CN−1 + C1CN−2 + · · ·+ CN−1C0
where C0 = 1 and C1 = 1. The first few terms are 1, 1, 2, 5, 14, 42, 132, 429, 1430, . . ., and we have the
explicit formula
CN =
1
N + 1
(
2N
N
)
.
One of the earliest enumerative results in permutation pattern avoidance is that the number of permuta-
tions avoiding any pattern of size 3 is counted by the Catalan sequence, so these will form denominators
in our probability calculations. We refer the reader to the textbook [B1´2] for details and references.
The ballot numbers (sequence A009766 in [Slo])
C(N, k) =
k + 1
N + 1
(
2N − k
N
)
are a refinement of the Catalan numbers (where C(N, 0) = C(N, 1) = CN ). Some data is shown in
Figure 4. They are defined by (either of) the recurrences
C(N, k) =
k∑
i=0
C(N − i, k + 1− i) = C(N − 1, k − 1) + C(N, k + 1)
with the initial conditions that C(N,N) = 1 for all N .
These ballot numbers arise as denominators of SN (p) probabilities.
3. 231-AVOIDING (ISOMORPHIC WITH 132-AVOIDING)
In this section, we derive optimal strategies for the 231-avoiding best choice game, and show that this
game is isomorphic to the 132-avoiding best choice game.
Lemma 3.1. Every 231-avoiding permutation pi decomposes as [pi1pi2 · · · pii−1Npii+1 · · · piN ]where each
entry of [pi1 · · · pii−1] is smaller in value than each entry of [pii+1 · · · piN ], and both of these are 231-
avoiding.
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N k = 0 k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 · · ·
1 1 1
2 2 2 1
3 5 5 3 1
4 14 14 9 4 1
5 42 42 28 14 5 1
6 132 132 90 48 20 6 1
7 429 429 297 165 75 27 7 1
8 1430 1430 1001 572 275 110 35 8 1
9 4862 4862 3432 2002 1001 429 154 44 9 1
FIGURE 4. Ballot numbers
Proof. Graphically, we are claiming that the diagram of any 231-avoiding permutation must have the
form
where each block is itself 231-avoiding. Observe that this decomposition also realizes the Catalan recur-
rence. This is straightforward (because N must play the role of 3 in any 231 instance) and well-known;
see [B1´2] for example. 
The complete 231-avoiding prefix tree for N = 4 is shown in Figure 5 with the strike probabilities
SN (p) given in parentheses. We mention that these prefix trees (up to some position/value conventions)
coincide with the generating trees used by West to give uniform proofs of some early enumerative results
on permutation patterns; see [Wes96] for an introduction.
1 (5/14)
12 (2/5)
123 (1/2)
1234 (1/1) 1243
132
1324 (1/1) 1423 1432
21
213 (1/2)
2134 (1/1) 2143
312
3124 (1/1) 4123 4132
321
3214 (1/1) 4213 4312 4321
FIGURE 5. 231-avoiding prefix tree for N = 4
Definition 3.2. Given a 231-avoiding permutation pi of size N , define ϕ(pi) as follows. Move the value
N (at least once) one position at a time to the right, keeping all other values in the same relative order.
Stop as soon as the permutation avoids 231.
In practice, this means that ϕ moves N past any and all entries that form an inversion with the entry
immediately to the right of N . Also note that placing N in the last position is always valid, so ϕ is
defined for all pi not having N in the last position.
For our main result, we define the successors of an eligible prefix p to be the set of prefixes q (eligible
or not) whose longest proper eligible prefix is p.
Theorem 3.3. For each eligible prefix p in the 231-avoiding prefix tree, we have
SN (p) =
⊕
successors q of p
SN (q).
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Proof. From the definitions, it is clear that the denominator on the left side is equal to the sum of the
denominators on the right side. Suppose pi is a 231-avoiding permutation of N and suppose that p is the
prefix flattening pi|[i], which ends in a left-to-right maximum. If including p in the strike set wins pi then
pii = N . In this case, ϕ(pi) will be winnable with q in the strike set for precisely one successor q, namely
q = ϕ(pi)|[j] where j is the position of N in ϕ(pi). Conversely, if q is an eligible successor of p and pi
is winnable with q in the strike set, then pij = N where j is the size of q. Sliding N back to position i,
where i is the size of p, and keeping the other values of pi in the same relative order yields a permutation
that is winnable with p in the strike set. Since pii will be the left-to-right maximum immediately prior to
pij = N in pi, the resulting permutation will remain 231-avoiding. Thus, for a fixed eligible prefix p, we
have that ϕ is a bijection from the set of p-winnable permutations to the union of the set of q-winnable
permutations where q is any eligible successor of p. This proves the numerator on the left side is equal
to the sum of the numerators on the right side. 
Corollary 3.4. For the 231-avoiding interviews, the completion of any antichain of eligible prefixes
forms an optimal strike set.
Proof. Consider the set of all 231-avoiding prefixes of size N . Any other antichain in the prefix tree
consisting of some eligible prefixes together with some prefixes of size N can be obtained from this
by a sequence of moves in which we replace a collection of successors with their predecessor, as in
Algorithm 2.2. By Theorem 3.3, we do not change the probability of success. 
Theorem 3.5. Any complete trigger set is optimal. In particular, any positional strategy is optimal.
Proof. We claim that
TN (p) =
⊕
children q of p
TN(q).
where TN(p) are the trigger probabilities defined as the number of pi that are won if p is included as a
trigger (explicitly, the number of pi where the last entry of p lies between the last two left-to-right maxima
in pi) divided by the total number of pi having p as a prefix flattening. We also allow a null prefix p = ∅;
as a trigger, this simply selects the first interview candidate. The trigger probabilities are illustrated for
N = 4 in Figure 6.
To verify the equation, let pi be a 231-avoiding permutation of N and suppose that p is the prefix
flattening pi|[i−1] and q is the prefix flattening pi|[i]. Then, there are several cases.
(1) Suppose pi|[i] does not end in a left-to-right maximum. Then pi is p-winnable if and only if it is
q-winnable.
(2) Suppose pi|[i] does end in a left-to-right maximum. Observe that ϕ(pi)|[i] also ends in a left-
to-right maximum since all entries to the right of N are larger than entries to the left of N by
Lemma 3.1.
Also note that in pi, value N must lie in some position j ≥ i (for otherwise we would be in
Case (1) above because N is always the last left-to-right maximum).
Now consider the following subcases:
(a) pi is q-winnable. Then j > i.
(b) pi is not q-winnable but ϕ(pi) is q-winnable. Then we must have j = i.
(c) Neither pi nor ϕ(pi) are q-winnable. Then neither element can be p-winnable because any
p-winnable element in Case (2) must have N in position i and then it is straightforward to
see that ϕ(pi) would be q-winnable.
Observe that applying ϕ is a bijection from the elements in subcase (b) to the elements in subcase
(a). Moreover, the elements in subcase (b) are p-winnable but not q-winnable, while elements
in subcase (a) are q-winnable but not p-winnable. The elements in subcase (c) are neither p-
winnable nor q-winnable.
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∅ (5/14)
1 (5/14)
12 (2/5)
123 (1/2)
1234 1243
132 (1/3)
1324 1423 1432
21 (3/9)
213 (1/2)
2134 2143
312 (1/3)
3124 4123 4132
321 (1/4)
3214 4213 4312 4321
FIGURE 6. Trigger probabilities for N = 4
Thus, the probabilities are preserved as claimed in each case. Since any trigger set can be obtained,
starting from all of the sizeN − 1 prefixes as our initial trigger set (which agrees with the corresponding
initial strike strategy) by a sequence of moves in which we replace a collection of children with their
parent, we find that any complete trigger strategy (and hence any positional strategy) is optimal. 
Theorem 3.6. For the 231-avoiding interviews of size N , the optimal probability of success is the ratio
of Catalan numbers CN−1/CN , which approaches 1/4 as N →∞.
Proof. Consider the strike set consisting of the CN 231-avoiding prefixes of size N . This is optimal by
Corollary 3.4. Exactly CN−1 of them are winnable because N must lie in the last position. Hence, the
numerator in the success probability for this strike set is CN−1. Therefore, the probability of success is
CN−1/CN , and the asymptotics for this ratio of Catalan numbers are straightforward from the explicit
formula given in Section 2. 
Finally, we show that the 231-avoiding prefix tree and SN (p) probabilities are isomorphic to those for
the 132-avoiding interview orders.
Definition 3.7. Let pi = [piL N piR] be a 231-avoiding permutation with the decomposition from
Lemma 3.1, so the block piL has values {1, 2, . . . , k} and piR has values {k + 1, . . . , N − 1}.
Then we define Υ recursively where Υ is the identity on permutations of size 2 or less and in general,
Υ(pi) = [Υ(piL)↑ N Υ(piR)↓]
where the ↑ and ↓ operators reverse the blocks of values; i.e. Υ(piL)↑ is a block with values {N −
k, . . . ,N−1} and relative order given byΥ(piL), andΥ(piR)↓ is a block with values {1, 2, . . . , N−k−1}
and relative order given by Υ(piR).
It is straightforward to check that Υ is a bijection from the set of 231-avoiding permutations of size
N to the set of 132-avoiding permutations of size N .
Theorem 3.8. The prefix tree for 231-avoiding permutations is isomorphic to the prefix tree for 132-
avoiding permutations.
Proof. Apply the bijection Υ to each 231-avoiding prefix p. We first claim that the tree structure is
preserved. Namely, if p is a prefix of q in the 231-avoiding tree then Υ(p) is a prefix of Υ(q) in the
132-avoiding tree. We refer to this as the prefix property. Note that it suffices to check this when the size
of p is one less than the size of q by transitivity.
Our strategy is to apply induction on the number of recursive steps used in the application of Υ. So
suppose that p and q are prefixes with q = [q1 · · · qi−1qi] where q|[i−1] and p have the same relative order.
If we applyΥ for a single recursive step, we will split p and q at their maximum elements, say pMAX and
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qMAX . If these elements are equal, then the left factors of p and q have the same relative order, while the
right factors differ by the extra element qi at the end of q. Since applying Υ shifts the values as a block,
we see that all of the elements in the right factors of q (not including qi) and p will continue to have the
same relative order. So the prefix property holds by induction in this case. Otherwise, we must have
qMAX = qi. Then this step has an empty right block in the decomposition of q. So, in the application of
Υ at the next recursive step for q we find that qMAX will agree with pMAX in the application at this step
for p, so the prefix property continues to hold by induction in this case also.
Since applying Υ does not change the position of N , we have that pi is pi|[j]-winnable if and only if
Υ(pi) is Υ(pi)|[j]-winnable. So the SN (p) probabilities are preserved as well. 
4. 321 AVOIDING (ISOMORPHIC WITH 312-AVOIDING)
4.1. Introduction. The best choice game restricted to the 321-avoiding interview orders is a bit more
complicated. The prefix trees for N = 4 and N = 5 (the latter omits the last level) with the SN (p)
probabilities are shown in Figure 7.
1 (1/14)
12 (3/9)
123 (3/4)
1234 (1/1)
1243 (0/1)
1342 (0/1)
2341 (0/1)
231 (0/3)
2314 (1/1)
2413 (0/1)
3412 (0/1)
132 (0/2)
1324 (1/1)
1423 (0/1)
21 (0/5)
213 (2/3)
2134 (1/1)
2143 (0/1)
3142 (0/1)
312 (0/2)
3124 (1/1)
4123 (0/1)
1 (1/42)
12 (4/28)
123 (6/14)
1234 (4/5)
1243 (0/2)
1342 (0/3)
2341 (0/4)
231 (0/9)
2314 (3/4)
2413 (0/2)
3412 (0/3)
132 (0/5)
1324 (2/3)
1423 (0/2)
21 (0/14)
213 (3/9)
2134 (3/4)
2143 (0/2)
3142 (0/3)
312 (0/5)
3124 (2/3)
4123 (0/2)
FIGURE 7. 321-avoiding prefix trees for N = 4 and N = 5
The following result describes the SN (p) probabilities for arbitrary N .
Theorem 4.1. For the 321-avoiding interview orders, the strike probabilities are
SN (p) =

SN−1(pˇ) if p is eligible and contains at least one inversion
(N−1
k−1)
k+1
N+1(
2N−k
N
)
if p = [12 · · · k]
where pˇ is the result of removing the value 1 from p (and flattening).
Proof. In any permutation pi with prefix p that contains an inversion, the position of the entry 1 in pi is
fixed: it must occur in the prefix or else it would create a 321 instance when paired with the inversion in
the prefix. Hence, removing the 1 from this position is a bijection to the corresponding subtree of N − 1
prefixes.
Next, suppose p has the form [12 · · · k] for some k. We prove the formulas for the denominator and
numerator separately. We claim the denominators are ballot numbers. To prove this, we show that
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they satisfy the same recurrence. Notice that there two possibilities for any pi of size N having prefix
[12 · · · k]:
• If the element in the next position after the prefix is larger than the maximum value in the prefix,
then pi is counted by the prefix [12 · · · (k + 1)] in N .
• Otherwise, the next element is smaller and so pi is counted by the prefix [12 · · · (k− 1)] inN − 1
after applying the pˇ bijection.
The initial conditions are that we only have one element with prefix [12 · · ·N ] in N . Hence, the denom-
inators agree with the ballot numbers we defined in Section 2.
For the numerator, let pi be a p-winnable permutation with p still equal to [12 · · · k]. If pi has N in
position k then everything afterN must be increasing (to avoid 321) so we just have to choose the subset
of values to place in the prefix. These are counted by the binomial
(
N−1
k−1
)
. 
In the prefix tree of rank N , let B◦(N, k) be the “open” subforest lying under (but not including)
[12 · · · k] and let B(N, k) be the “closed” subtree lying under (and including) [12 · · · k]. Then we may
interpret the first part of Theorem 4.1 as an isomorphism of prefix “forests” (i.e. disjoint unions of trees).
Corollary 4.2. We have a bijection
B◦(N, k) ∼= B(N, k + 1) ∪
k⋃
i=1
B◦(N − i, k + 1− i)
where each nonzero strike probability on the left side occurs for the isomorphic image on the right side.
In particular, we may obtain an optimal strike set for the forest on the left side as the union of (the
isomorphic images of) optimal strike sets for each tree in the forest on the right side.
Proof. Note that the children of [12 · · · k] in the prefix tree consist of the permutations of size k + 1 that
are increasing for the first k entries and end with some value i = 1, 2, . . . , k+1. Only the [12 · · · (k+1)]
child ends with a left-to-right maximum so we apply the pˇ bijection i times to identify each of the other
children with an increasing prefix from some smaller rank. Since none of these children are eligible
in rank N , though, we only transfer open subforests, not the node itself. (Hence, we are comitting an
abuse of notation by including the nonincreasing children of [12 · · · k] themselves on the left side of the
bijection; however, this does not affect any of the nonzero strike probabilities or winning strategies.)
As explained in the proof of Theorem 4.1, the inverse of pˇ simply inserts a new lowest entry into the
position where 1 appears in p. In particular, the inverse image of a subforest B◦(N − i, k + 1− i) from
the right side consists of the prefixes on the left side with their i smallest entries in fixed position. 
Example 4.3. Consider N = 5. Iterating the bijection gives
B◦(5, 1) ∼= B(5, 2) ∪ B◦(4, 1) ∼= B(5, 3) ∪ B◦(4, 2) ∪ B◦(3, 1) ∪ B◦(4, 1)
∼= B(5, 4) ∪ B◦(4, 3) ∪ B◦(3, 2) ∪ B◦(2, 1) ∪ B◦(4, 2) ∪ B◦(3, 1) ∪ B◦(4, 1)
For example, B◦(3, 2) here corresponds to the subforest under the prefix [1342] inN = 5. (The bijection
inserts value 1 into the first position and 2 into the fourth position of each of the three prefixes under [12]
in N = 3.) We find that [1234] is the optimal strike in B(5, 4) so we can stop here. We may obtain the
other strikes from smaller ranks using the bijection.
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4.2. Optimal strategy. Let B◦N (p) denote the probability of success using an optimal strategy for the
interview orderings restricted to the 321-avoiding open subforest under (but not including) the prefix p.
The following corollary permits B◦ to be computed recursively.
Corollary 4.4. We have
B◦N (12 · · · k) = max(B
◦
N (12 · · · (k + 1)),SN (12 · · · (k + 1)))⊕
k⊕
i=1
B◦N−i(12 · · · (k + 1− i)).
Equivalently,
B◦N (12 · · · k) = B
◦
N−1(12 · · · (k − 1))⊕
(
B◦N−1(12 · · · k)−max(B
◦
N−1(12 · · · k),SN−1(12 · · · k))
)
⊕max(B◦N (12 · · · (k + 1)),SN (12 · · · (k + 1))).
Proof. This follows directly from the definitions and Corollary 4.2. 
In particular, B◦N (1) gives the probability of success under the optimal strategy for the entire collection
of 321-avoiding interview orders. The B◦N (12 · · · k) numerators for N ≤ 16 are shown in Figure 8; the
denominators are all ballot numbers (not shown).
N\k 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
2 1 ∗
3 3 1
4 8 5 1
5 23 15 7 1
6 71 48 25 9 ∗ 1
7 229 158 87 39 11 1
8 759 530 301 143 56 13 1
9 2568 1809 1050 520 219 76 15 1
10 8833 6265 3697 1888 838 318 99 17 1
11 30797 21964 13131 6866 3169 1281 443 125 19 1
12 108613 77816 47019 25055 11924 5058 1889 608 154 ∗ 21 1
13 386804 278191 169578 91762 44743 19688 7764 2706 817 186 23 1
14 1389109 1002305 615501 337310 167732 75970 31227 11539 3775 1069 221 25 1
15 5024945 3635836 2246727 1244422 628921 291611 123879 47909 16682 5143 1368 259 27 1
16 18292738 13267793 8242848 4607012 2360285 1115863 486942 195331 71452 23543 6861 1718 300 29 1
FIGURE 8. The first few rows of the B◦ triangle
Say that an entry (N, k) is optimal if SN (12 · · · k) > B
◦
N (12 · · · k). Such an entry represents the
root of a subtree for which the optimal strike set is simply the prefix itself, so such a prefix is “locally”
optimal. The optimal boundary in the B◦ triangle is the collection consisting of the leftmost optimal
entry from each row and we have highlighted these in bold in Figure 8. Such entries represent increasing
prefixes that are globally optimal, so appear in the optimal strike set for N .
We now prove an important structural result about these entries, namely, that the optimal boundary
proceeds by diagonal and vertical steps as N increases.
Theorem 4.5. If (N, k) is optimal then so is (N + 1, k + 1). Also, if (N, k) is not optimal then neither
is (N + 1, k).
Proof. For the first statement in the theorem, note that it is enough to prove that the ratios
B◦
N
(12···k)
SN (12···k)
are decreasing as we move down diagonals; once B
◦
S
< 1, it then remains so for all subsequent entries
along the same diagonal. Equivalently, we show that the ratios
B◦
N−1
(12···(k−1))
B◦
N
(12···k) are bounded below by
SN−1(12···(k−1))
SN (12···k)
= k−1
N−1 .
For the remainder of this proof, we abuse notation to refer to the numerators only; the denominators
in each probability are ballot numbers which appear on both sides of the inequality so can be canceled.
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Following the ballot number conventions, we also extend the B◦ triangle to include an extra column on
the left, defining B◦N (∅) = B
◦
N (1).
To avoid a profusion of closely related subscripts, we will let letters denote positions in the B◦ and
S triangles so each letter corresponds to a particular (N, k) pair as defined in Figure 9 . If the letter is
unadorned, it represents the B◦ value at that position. If it has a bar, it represents the complementary
term in a recurrence for B◦, namely the max(B◦,S) value at that position plus the B◦ − max(B◦,S)
value at the position just northwest. Observe that this enables us to write
x = b + y¯
by Corollary 4.4. Finally, we represent the S values by capital letters (to emphasize that these are simply
binomial coefficients by Theorem 4.1).
k − 3 k − 2 k − 1 k k + 1
N − 2
N − 1
N
g c
f b a
e x y
FIGURE 9. Letter coordinates and key ratios for the induction argument
Applying the defining recurrence (twice), we have x = b + y¯ and b = c + a¯, so
(4.1)
b
x
=
b
b + y¯
=
1
1 + y¯b
=
1
1 + y¯c+a¯
=
1
1 + 1c
y¯
+ a¯
y¯
=
1
1 + 1a¯
y¯ (
c
a¯
+1)
.
Now, if we produce lower bounds for c
a¯
and a¯
y¯
then this expression gives a lower bound for bx . So, we
claim the following lower bounds, to be proved by induction:
(4.2)
b
x
≥
B
X
,
b
y¯
≥
B
X −B
, and
b¯
x¯
≥
F −G
E − F
.
If valid, we say that an inequality holds at b, the entry appearing in the numerator on the left side. Recall
that the first bound is our primary goal in this proof (but we evidently require the others to facilitate it).
For the base case, we solve the recurrences to find explicit formulas along the rightmost diagonals:
we find that B◦N(N − 1) = 1 and B
◦
N (N − 2) = 2N − 3 for all N ≥ 3. The bar value y¯ is 2 at position
(N,N − 1) for all N ≥ 3 and x¯ is 3N − 7 at position (N,N − 2) for all N ≥ 7.
The binomial formula for S from Theorem 4.1 yields
B
X
=
k − 1
N − 1
,
B
X −B
=
k − 1
N − k
,
F −G
E − F
=
(k − 2)
(N − 2)
=
C
B
.
Then we can verify each of the claimed inequalities from (4.2) directly for k = N − 2, N ≥ 7:
b
x
=
2N − 5
2N − 3
≥
N − 3
N − 1
=
B
X
,
b
y¯
=
2N − 5
2
≥
N − 3
2
=
B
X −B
, and
b¯
x¯
=
3N − 10
3N − 7
≥
N − 4
N − 2
=
F −G
E − F
.
Now assume that we have all three of the inequalities from (4.2) at entries along the current diagonal
including the entry c and at all entries on diagonals to the right including the entry a. We now derive
each of the bounds at b.
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By the induction hypothesis,
a¯
y¯
≥
B − C
X −B
and
c
a¯
≥
C
B − C
.
Substituting these into our expression from Equation (4.1), we obtain
b
x
=
1
1 + 1a¯
y¯ (
c
a¯
+1)
≥
1
1 + 1B−C
X−B
( C
B−C
+1)
=
1
1 + 1B−C
X−B
( B
B−C
)
=
1
1 + 1B
X−B
.
When we simplify this expression, we find that this is precisely equal to B
X
, as required. Moreover, this
calculation already verifies the second bound as
b
y¯
=
a¯
y¯
( c
a¯
+ 1
)
≥
B − C
X −B
(
C
B − C
+ 1
)
=
B
X −B
.
Finally, we evaluate b¯
x¯
in cases. Recall,
b¯ = max(B◦,S)(b) + B◦(c) −max(B◦,S)(c)
The argument up to here already shows ifmax(B◦,S) = B◦ for entry c, b, or x, then it remains so for all
entries above to the northwest. So the cases for
b¯
x¯
=
max(B◦,S)(b) + B◦(c) −max(B◦,S)(c)
max(B◦,S)(x) + B◦(b)−max(B◦,S)(b)
are: none of c, b, or x have max = B◦; c alone does; b and c do; or all three do.
For the first case, we claim that
b¯
x¯
=
B + c− C
X + b−B
≥
C
B
=
F −G
E − F
because c
b
≥ C
B
and B
X
≥ C
B
so B(B + c) ≥ C(X + b) whence
B(B + c− C) ≥ C(X + b−B)
yielding the desired inequality.
For the other three cases, we have B+c−c
X+b−B =
B
X+b−B ≥
B
X
, b+c−c
X+b−b =
b
X
≥ B
X
, and b+c−c
x+b−b =
b
x
. For
the last case, note that bx ≥
B
X
by the induction argument to this point. So in each case we have b¯
x¯
≥ B
X
and since (k − 1)(N − 2) ≥ (N − 1)(k − 2) for k ≤ N , we obtain B
X
≥ F−G
E−F
as desired.
The induction proceeds along each row from right to left. Since B◦N (∅) = B
◦
N (1), once we prove that
b
x
≥ B
X
for b = (N − 1, 1), we automatically get that f
x¯
= b
x
≥ B
X
= F
E−F
. Thus, the induction may
proceed to the next row.
The proof of the second statement in the theorem now follows directly. Continuing our notation, we
have
1 =
b+ y¯
x
≥
b+ a
x
≥
B
X
+
a
x
because y¯ = a+ (max(B◦,S)(y)−max(B◦,S)(a)) and by the inequalities we already proved. Hence,
a
x
≤ 1−
B
X
=
X −B
X
=
1(
B
X−B
) (B
X
)
=
N − k
N − 1
=
A
X
.
Thus, if a is not optimal then 1 ≤ a
A
≤ x
X
and so x is not optimal either. 
Definition 4.6. We say that the value-saturated left-to-right maxima of a prefix p = p1 · · · pk are the
largest subset of left-to-right maxima in pwhose values form an interval {k−i+1, k−i+2, · · · , k−1, k}
for some i.
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Given a node p = [p1p2 · · · pk] from the prefix tree of 321-avoiding permutations of size N , we refer
to N as the rank of p and k as the size of p. Let σ(i) be the minimal k such that (N, k) is optimal
among the entries where N − k = i. That is, σ(i) is the column containing the ith vertical step along
the optimal boundary of the B◦ table. We know that σ(i) is a well-defined weakly increasing function by
Theorem 4.5.
We say p is selected by the threshold if
(4.3) # value-saturated left-to-right maxima in p ≥ σ(rank(p)− size(p)).
Lemma 4.7. We have that p is selected by the threshold if and only if pˇ is selected by the threshold.
Proof. Applying the pˇ bijection from Theorem 4.1 removes the lowest entry from p and reduces the rank
by 1. This does not change the right side of the threshold inequality (4.3). The only way that removing
the lowest entry could change the number of value-saturated left-to-right maxima in p is if we removed
the first entry of a prefix with the form [12 · · · i]. But this is not possible because we require at least
one inversion in p in order to apply the bijection. Hence, we do not change the left side of the threshold
inequality either. 
Theorem 4.8. For any N and k, we have that p is included in the optimal strike set for B◦(N, k) if and
only if
• p is eligible,
• p is selected by the threshold, and
• no proper prefix of p ∈ B◦(N, k) is selected by the threshold.
Proof. We argue by strong induction on N . For N = 1 and N = 2, we have that the prefix [1] is an
optimal strike and it is selected by the threshold in each case. So suppose the result holds for all ranks
M < N .
Recalling Corollary 4.2, we may view B◦(N, k) as a disjoint union. Any prefix from
⋃k
i=1 B
◦(N −
i, k+1− i) will be selected by the threshold if and only if it is optimal, by our induction hypothesis and
Lemma 4.7.
So it suffices to show that the prefixes from B(N, k + 1) conform to the threshold. Let j be the
leftmost optimal entry in row N of the B◦ table. If k + 1 ≤ j then [12 · · · j] is in the optimal strike set
by definition. Otherwise, we claim that [12 · · · (k+1)] is in the optimal strike set. This follows from the
fact that the strike numerators for increasing prefixes are binomial coefficients so this prefix must have
the largest strike numerator in the subtree under [12 · · · (k+1)] (or else we contradict k+1 > j because
the set of optimal entries on each row of the B◦ table is an interval by Theorem 4.5).
Now, since the number of value-saturated left-to-right maxima in an increasing prefix is equal to its
size, we find that an increasing prefix is selected by the threshold precisely when it corresponds to an
optimal entry (N, k) in the B◦ table. Thus, the prefixes from B(N, k + 1) conform to the threshold. 
Corollary 4.9. For 321-avoiding interview orders, the optimal strategy is a threshold strike strategy
using the number of value-saturated left-to-right maxima as the statistic. Moreover, a single threshold
function works simultaneously for all N .
Proof. This follows by applying Theorem 4.8 to B◦(N, 1). 
To play the optimal strategy on a given interview ordering pi, reject candidates until we are at some
eligible prefix flattening, pi|[k], where we have seen σ(N −k) value-saturated left-to-right maxima. Then
select the kth candidate. From small values ofN , we can compute the beginning of the optimal threshold
function precisely. The first few values are:
σ(N) = σ(N − 1) = 1, σ(N − 2) = 4, σ(N − 3) = 9, σ(N − 4) = 16, . . . .
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N\k 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
2 4
3 -1 4
4 2 3 4
5 13 9 7 4
6 151 33 20 11 4
7 164 219 68 35 15 4
8 764 505 341 122 54 19 4
9 2568 1809 1045 540 199 77 23 4
10 8833 6265 3697 1888 843 303 104 27 4
11 30797 21964 13131 6866 3169 1281 438 135 31 4
12 108613 77816 47019 25055 11924 5058 1889 608 170 35 4
13 386804 278191 169578 91762 44743 19688 7764 2706 817 209 39 4
14 1389109 1002305 615501 337310 167732 75970 31227 11539 3775 1069 252 43 4
15 5024945 3635836 2246727 1244422 628921 291611 123879 47909 16682 5143 1368 299 47 4
16 18292738 13267793 8242848 4607012 2360285 1115863 486942 195331 71452 23543 6861 1718 350 51 4
FIGURE 10. The linear combination of ballot numbers that agrees with B◦(1,4,9)
These rules say that by the time you get to interview k = N or k = N − 1, you should always accept
the kth interview candidate. However, when N is large enough to permit it and you have seen an “un-
usually high” number of value-saturated left-to-right maxima, it can also be optimal to accept an earlier
candidate.
The complete list of rules (compiled for all N ≤ 10000) indicate that the threshold function has the
form σ(N − i) = i2 for all i ≥ 1. We do know that the rules we computed for these “small” values of
N remain in force for all N by Theorem 4.5. It would be interesting to obtain the asymptotic threshold
function and probability of success precisely.
4.3. An asymptotic lower bound. In this section we show how to compute the probability of success for
the particular threshold strategy defined by using the first four rules, σ(N) = σ(N−1) = 1, σ(N− 2) =
4, and σ(N − 3) = 9, from the optimal strategy. This threshold strategy has an associated triangle of
“interior” probabilities that we denote B◦(1,4,9)(N, k). The only difference between this triangle and the
B◦N (12 · · · k) triangle from the last subsection is that the optimal boundary (i.e. the leftmost entries where
S > B◦(1,4,9)) follows the k = N − 3 diagonal forever and so all entries on or left of the k = N − 5
diagonal are obtained from the recurrence
B◦(1,4,9)(N, k) = B
◦
(1,4,9)(N − 1, k − 1) + B
◦
(1,4,9)(N, k + 1).
This is the same recurrence that is satisfied by the ballot numbers, and it turns out we can write B◦(1,4,9)
as a linear combination of “shifted” ballot numbers. This allows us to compute the first entry in each row
precisely, which gives the total probability of success.
Definition 4.10. Define the i-shifted ballot triangle Ci(N, k) to be the result of replacing N by N − i
in the ballot number formula from Section 2 (where we interpret any binomial coefficients with negative
indices as zero).
Theorem 4.11. We have that B◦(1,4,9)(N, k) agrees with the triangle
4C1(N, k) − 9C2(N, k) + 2C4(N, k) + 105C5(N, k) − 206C6(N, k) + 95C7(N, k)− 5C8(N, k).
for all N ≥ 11 and 1 ≤ k ≤ N − 5.
Proof. As we have observed, all of the triangles under discussion satisfy the recurrence
X(N, k) = X(N − 1, k − 1) +X(N, k + 1)
at least in the region of (N, k) values lying on or to the left of the k = (N − 5)th diagonal. But this can
be translated to recurrences for the entries along each particular diagonal.
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Let xN = X(N,N − k) be the sequence of entries along a particular diagonal. When k = 2, we have
xN+1 = xN + c. Successively replacing each xN with its difference xN − xN−1 we obtain a recurrence
for the next diagonal to the left. For k = 3, for example, we obtain (xN+1 − xN ) = (xN − xN−1) + c
which reduces to xN+1 = 2xN −xN−1+ c. In general, the recurrence for entries along the kth diagonal
will have degree k (and its coefficients will be alternating binomial coefficients; see [GKP94]).
Hence, once we have agreement between B◦(1,4,9) and the linear combination of shifted ballot numbers
for six terms along the k = N − 5 diagonal, we must have agreement forever along this diagonal and
therefore for all entries along diagonals to the left. A finite computation illustrated in Figure 10 shows
that this indeed occurs for N ≥ 11 and k ≤ N − 5. 
Corollary 4.12. The asymptotic probability of success under the optimal strategy for the 321-avoiding
interview orders is at least 32983/65536 which is about 0.5032806396484.
Proof. In the linear combination of shifted ballot numbers from Theorem 4.11, set k = 1, divide by the
N th Catalan number, and take the limit as N →∞. We obtain
4
(
1
4
)1
− 9
(
1
4
)2
+ 2
(
1
4
)4
+ 105
(
1
4
)5
− 206
(
1
4
)6
+ 95
(
1
4
)7
− 5
(
1
4
)8
.

4.4. Other strategies. We have also investigated positional and trigger strategies for 321-avoiding in-
terview orders. Although they are not generally optimal, it may be convenient to compare them more
directly with the classical best choice game analysis. Positional strategies are also simpler to implement
and require less memory. In this subsection, we briefly outline the main results.
The 321-avoiding permutations are completely determined by the values and positions of their left-to-
right maxima (as the complementary entries must be increasing to avoid 321). These left-to-right maxima
may be encoded by Dyck paths on an N ×N grid lying above the diagonal. The interviews that are k-
winnable (where k represents a position to transition from rejection to hiring) then correspond to Dyck
paths whose next to last horizontal segment passes through column k. These can be counted recursively
to obtain a success probability in the form of a linear combination of ratios of Catalan numbers. For
example, the positional strategy of transitioning after k = N − 3 has a success probability of
3CN−1 − 4CN−2 − CN−3
CN
.
The main result in this direction is that for all N > 8, transitioning from rejection to hiring after k =
N − 3 turns out to be the optimal positional strategy and has limiting value 3164 = 0.484375. Further
details are given in [FJ18].
More generally, we considered trigger strategies for the 321-avoiding interviews. Replacing Theo-
rem 4.1, we have
Theorem 4.13. For the 321-avoiding interview orders, we have
TN (p) =

TN−1(pˇ) if p contains at least one inversion
k(N−1
k+1)+(
N−1
k
)
k+1
N+1(
2N−k
N
)
if p = [12 · · · k] (with k = 0 corresponding to p = ∅)
where TN (p) is the probability of winning (restricted to the subtree under p) if p is included in the trigger
set.
One can define an analogous B◦N triangle with slightly simpler recurrence
B◦N (12 · · · k) = B
◦
N−1(12 · · · (k − 1))⊕max(B
◦
N (12 · · · (k + 1)),TN (12 · · · (k + 1))).
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The optimal trigger sets can be translated to a statistical trigger strategy based on value-saturated left-to-
right maxima, proved along the same lines as we have done for our strike strategy. The optimal trigger
threshold function grows similarly to a quadratic but does not seem to satisfy a simple formula. The first
few values are
σ(N − 2) = 1, σ(N − 3) = 3, σ(N − 4) = 8, σ(N − 5) = 15, σ(N − 6) = 25, σ(N − 7) = 36, . . . .
ForN ≥ 12, it turns out that the optimal trigger strategy is not optimal overall. However, a lower bound
(proved similarly to Theorem 4.11) for the asymptotic probability of success using the optimal trigger
strategy is 8239/16384, which is about 0.50286865.
4.5. Bijection for 312-avoiding. In this subsection, we explain why the 321-avoiding prefix tree is
isomorphic to the 312-avoiding prefix tree. This is essentially “West’s bijection” of generating trees
described in [Wes95] and [CK09] although some of the position/value conventions are different; we give
a self-contained account here for completeness.
Given a prefix permutation of size N − 1, there are potentially N children in the prefix tree, each
corresponding to a value in the last position which we refer to as index of the child. The other values
and positions in the child are then completely determined by the parent prefix.
These indices are determined by inversions in the parent permutation. We will refer to an inversion by
its values which we denote by (b > a).
Lemma 4.14. Fix a prefix permutation pi of size N − 1 in the 321-avoiding prefix tree. Then, the indices
for the children of pi are
{1, 2, . . . , N} \ {j : j ≤ a for an inversion (b > a) in pi}.
(So it suffices to consider the inversion with the largest minimal value.)
Fix a prefix permutation pi of size N − 1 in the 312-avoiding prefix tree. Then, the indices for the
children of pi are
{1, 2, . . . , N} \ {j : a < j ≤ b for an inversion (b > a) in pi}.
Proof. It is straightforward to verify that these conditions directly encapsulate the pattern avoidance
criteria. 
Corollary 4.15. The child indices form a nested decreasing sequence of subsets along any path in the
prefix tree.
Theorem 4.16. The prefix tree for 321-avoiding permutations is isomorphic to the prefix tree for 312-
avoiding permutations.
Proof. We will actually claim a little more in order to establish the isomorphism. First, we claim that
the number of children for a permutation pi in the 321-avoiding prefix tree is the same as the number
of children in the isomorphic node of the 312-avoiding prefix tree. This means the denominators of the
strike probabilities remain the same. Second, we claim that the positions (but not necessarily the values!)
of the left-to-right maxima of pi in the 321-avoiding prefix tree are equal to the positions of the left-to-
right maxima of the isomorphic node of the 312-avoiding prefix tree. This means the position of N , and
hence winnability, is preserved so the numerators of the strike probabilities remain the same.
We work by induction on permutation size. The claims are true for permutations of size < 3, estab-
lishing a base case.
Suppose that pi is a 321-avoiding permutation of size N − 1 with child indices
c1, c2, . . . , cm−1 = N − 1, cm = N
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321-avoiding 312-avoiding
213 213
3142 2143
2143 3241
2134 2134
312 321
4123 4321
3124 3214
132 231
1423 3421
1324 2314
231 132
3412 1432
2413 2431
2314 1324
123 123
2341 1243
1342 1342
1243 2341
1234 1234
FIGURE 11. Correspondence for N = 4
(arranged increasingly). By induction, there exists a corresponding 312-avoiding permutation pi with the
same number of children, say
c˜1 = 1, c˜2, . . . , c˜m = N
(also arranged increasingly), and having the same positions for left-to-right maxima as pi.
We now show that each of the children of pi also has a corresponding element in the 312-avoiding
prefix tree. The child cm = N corresponds to the child c˜m = N and each child has the same indices as
its parent since no new inversions are created. Hence, the first claim is satisfied by induction. Also, N
will be a new left-to-right maximum, so the second claim is satisfied by induction.
Otherwise, we claim that the child ci will correspond to the child c˜m−i. To see this, note that the
value ci will form the minimal entry of a new inversion (N > ci) in the child permutation. Hence, by
Lemma 4.14, the child ci will need to remove c1, c2, . . . , ci from its set of indices.
Similarly for the 312-avoiding tree, the value c˜m−i forms the minimal entry of a new inversion (N >
c˜m−i) so the child c˜m−i will need to remove c˜m−i+1, c˜m−i+1, . . . , c˜m by Lemma 4.14, which is also a
total of i indices removed. Also, one new index N + 1 will be added for each child.
Hence, the first claim is satisfied by induction. Also, neither of the entries in position N will be a
left-to-right maximum, so the second claim is satisfied by induction. 
Example 4.17. The correspondence begins as shown in Figure 11.
5. THE REMAINING SIZE THREE PATTERNS
The 123-avoiding and 213-avoiding interview orders give distinct best choice problems but have distri-
butions that are essentially decreasing so the optimal strategy is to always to choose the next left-to-right
maximum after the first entry. Although these are not so interesting from the game perspective, they
complete our analysis of all the size 3 patterns. For the following results, we continue to let C(N, k)
denote the ballot numbers.
Proposition 5.1. For the 123-avoiding interviews, we have
SN (p) =

C(N − 1, k − 1)/C(N − 1, k − 1) if p = (k − 1) (k − 2) · · · 2 1 k and 2 ≤ k ≤ N
C(N−1)
C(N) if p = 1
0 otherwise.
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Hence, the optimal strategy is to accept the second left-to-right maximum. This succeeds with asymptotic
probability 3/4.
Proof. Observe that a 123-avoiding permutation can have at most two left-to-right maxima, and S(p)
is 0 unless p has the form of a decreasing sequence followed by a left-to-right maximum. That is,
p = (k − 1)(k − 2) · · · 1k with one prefix for each 1 ≤ k ≤ N .
By rejecting the first interview candidate, we can capture all of the other eligible strikes. When we
add these, we obtain total probability of success
C(N − 1, N − 1) + C(N − 1, N − 2) + · · ·+ C(N − 1, 1)
C(N)
=
C(N, 2)
C(N)
=
3N(N − 1)
2N(2N − 1)
which is more than the
C(N−1)
C(N) as we would obtain by accepting p = 1. 
Proposition 5.2. For the 213-avoiding interviews, we have
SN (p) =
{
C(N−1,k−1)
C(N,k) if p = 12 · · · k and 1 ≤ k ≤ N
0 otherwise.
Hence, the optimal strategy is accept the first or second left-to-right maximum. This succeeds with
asymptotic probability 1/4.
Proof. Observe that any 213-avoiding permutation that ends in a left-to-right maximum must be increas-
ing. So, SN (p) = 0 if p is not increasing. Otherwise, p = 12 · · · k, so SN (p) =
C(N−1,k−1)
C(N,k) (as the ballot
numbers count the total number of 213-avoiding permutations under a given increasing prefix, so remov-
ing the value N gives a bijection to smaller rank). These prefixes all contain each other so we should
pick the one with largest number of wins. As the numerators are decreasing, it is optimal to choose the
first or second one. 
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